EPIDEMICS ON NETWORKS


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# Epidemic modelling using networks


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We're experiencing one of the biggest socio-economic disruptions of all time

- ► How do large epidemics behave?
- What changes might we need to make to control and accommodate to the disease as it changes?

This talk

► Look at *one approach* to modelling, using network science

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# Why am I here?

BACKGROUND

I'm a computer scientist interested in network science, sensing, and data analytics

- A tool builder: how do we make computers useful for answering questions?
- ► The questions themselves are less important...

The uses of computers in generating insight

- ► To simulate *particular events* in detail
- To explore the space of *possible events* to suggest options
- To understand the general computational and mathematical *processes* involved

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## Acknowledgements

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Collaborators (some of whom did most of the work)

- ▶ Peter Mann, Saray Shai, Mike Pitcher, Davide Cellai
- ▶ V. Anne Smith, John Mitchell, Juan Ye, Lei Fang
- ▶ Libby Askew, Leo Pfeiffer, Martynas Noreika

Funding from UK EPSRC



Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council

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## Structure of this talk

Background Measuring diseases Compartmented models of disease

Epidemics on networks Mathematical approach Simulating epidemics on networks

Some explorations


Changing the contact network Immunity Physical countermeasures Variants

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#### Real diseases – general structure



#### Different periods

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- ► *Incubation*: from infection to onset of symptoms
- *Latent*: from exposure to infectiousness
- ► *Infectious*: overlapping with symptoms (usually)


Periods defined by biology, of both disease and host

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#### Real diseases – examples



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#### Real diseases – spread

Disease is spread by the exchange of a pathogen

From infected to non-infected individuals

#### Different infection patterns

- ► How many other people does each person meet each day?
- How closely do they interact? For how long? In what way? For how long?

Infections defined by biology and environment

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#### Real diseases – evolution

A person infected at the *end* of an epidemic doesn't get the same disease as a person infected at the *start* 

- Pathogen is constantly mutating
- Lateral gene transfer from co-infecting pathogens
- Another reason to work to reduce transmission

Selection pressures often (but don't necessarily) introduce a particular dynamics

- More transmissible
- Less severe

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# ${\cal R}$ and all that $^1$

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 $\mathcal{R}$ , the case reproduction number

- Number of secondary cases per primary
- The exponent of an exponential growth process
- Especially  $\mathcal{R}_0$ , reproduction absent countermeasures

Typically averages over (unknown) distributions

- Details may be very significant
- For example may see "superspreaders" creating lots more infections

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 1}$  Royal Society SET-C group. Reproduction number (R) and growth rate (r) of the COVID-19 epidemic in the UK, August 2020. URL

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# The "wickedness" of covid-19

BA

For "wild type"  $\mathcal{R}_0\approx 3,$  not particularly infectious

- ► More infectious, less severe (maybe) variants emerge
- Some tendency towards vaccine escape
- Prior infection doesn't give clear-cut, long-term immunity

#### Substantial asymptomatic transmission

- ► Asymmetric costs (spreading *vs* dying, "long covid")
- Effective countermeasures are collective (and expensive)

#### Infection fatality rate is about 1%

- Too large to comfortably ignore
- ...but too small to generate a consensus on seriousness

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What are we trying to find out?

- Concrete: how will this *particular* outbreak behave, in this *particular* population?
- Abstract: how can diseases behave *in general*? Are there common mathematical structures?

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Traditional epidemic modelling uses the framework of a *compartmented model* of a disease

- A number of "compartments" that hold some fraction of the population
- Can also think of a compartment as the state of each individual within the population (we'll come back to this)
- Rules on how these fractions change over time

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# **CONTINUOUS SIR**

## The model

- Susceptible individuals can catch the infection from Infected individuals
- ...who then are Removed from the dynamics by recovery (or death)

## Epidemic dynamics

- Susceptibles infected per contact with probability β
- Infecteds removed with probability α

• Gives rise to 
$$\mathcal{R}_0 = \frac{\beta}{\alpha}$$

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -\beta SI \qquad \frac{dI}{dt} = \beta SI - \alpha I \qquad \frac{dR}{dt} = \alpha I$$


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# Solution



Different disease structures<sup>2</sup>

- ► SIR complete immunity post-infection
- ► SIS infection confers no immunity
- SEIR exposed individuals are infectious before symptoms
- MSEIR initial immunity passed from mother to child
- ► SEIRS immunity wears off with time

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>H. Hethcote. The mathematics of infectious diseases. SIAM Review, 42(4):599–653, December 2000. URL doi://10.1137/S0036144500371907

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## Structure of this talk

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Conclusions

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# Network science

Networks (or graphs)

- Model objects and relationships in an abstract mathematical form
- Use as a substrate for processes that affect the states of objects and their relationships over time



Social networks

- Individuals and their social contacts
- ► May be real or synthetic

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#### NETWORK SCIENCE FOR EPIDEMIC MODELLING

Use a network as the substrate for the epidemic <sup>3</sup>

- Only adjacent nodes can interact
- Compartment = label on node
- ► Infection passes over **SI** edges

Pros and cons

- Doesn't scale as well as the differential equations (we're modelling explicit individuals)
- ✓ Can build contact structures and systems of equations we can't solve (but can simulate)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>M. Newman. Spread of epidemic disease on networks. *Physical Review E*, 66, July 2002. URL doi://10.1103/PhysRevE.66.016128

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### BASIC TREATMENT – NETWORKS

Start from a simple model of a population

- ► As a random process, collected from contact data, ...
- Actually a lot we don't know about how people interact

#### Add fine structure

- Structured contact patterns
- More- and less-well-connected sub-populations
- Adaptive behaviour to change features over time and/or in response to the disease

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### BASIC TREATMENT – PROCESSES

Assign a state vector to each node

► For epidemics, this might be the node's compartment

Process defines changes to state vectors

- A function of current states of the node and its immediate neighbours
- Generally stochastic, applied with some probability

Seed the network with initial state vectors

► For SIR, mainly susceptible with a few infected


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## How to do analysis

The "gold standard" is an analytic model with numerical validation

- Find an analytic description for what happens under different infection parameters
- Run process on random networks with different topologies
- Lots of repetitions to squeeze out variance
- (Hopefully) sample points land on solutions to the equations <sup>4</sup>



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> P. Mann, V. A. Smith, J. Mitchell, and S. Dobson. Random graphs with arbitrary clustering and their applications. *Physical Review E*, 103(1), January 2021a. URL https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.103.012309

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#### DISCRETE-EVENT SIMULATION

A simulation consists of a large series of *events* 

- ► An infected person infected a susceptible person
- An exposed person developed symptoms
- An infected person recovered

Events selected using Gillespie's algorithm <sup>5</sup>

- ►  $P(\tau, e) d\tau$  the probability that an event *e* occurs in the next interval  $(t + \tau, t + \tau + d\tau)$
- Draw a pair  $(\tau, e)$  from this distribution

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>D. Gillespie. Exact stochastic simulation of coupled chemical reactions. *Journal of Physical Chemistry*, 81(25): 2340—2361, 1977

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## Tooling

There wasn't any standard tooling, so we built some

A flexible way to express networks and processes

- epydemic, a simulation framework using networkx
- Reference epidemic (and other) processes
- Support for the main mathematical techniques, such as generating functions

A way to perform repeated, repeatable, experiments

- epyc, a computational experiment manager
- Experiment submission, parallelism, remote evaluation

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#### Example code

```
import numpy
import pandas
from epvc import ClusterLab, HDF5LabNotebook, RepeatedExperiment
from epydemic import ERNetwork, SIR, StochasticDynamics
# notebook for results and lab with connection to compute cluster
nb = HDF5LabNotebook('test.h5', description='My_lexperiments_lin_networking')
lab = ClusterLab(profile='hogun', notebook=nb)
# set up the experimental parameters
lab[ERNetwork.N] = 10000
lab[ERNetwork.KMEAN] = 40
lab[SIR.P INFECTED] = 0.001
lab[SIR.P_REMOVE] = 0.002
lab[SIR.P_INFECT] = numpy.linspace(0.00001, 0.0002, num=50)
# construct the experiment: a process and a class of networks
m = STR()
g = ERNetwork()
e = StochasticDvnamics(m, g)
# repeat runs across the parameter space
lab.runExperiment(RepeatedExperiment(e, 100))
# retrieve for analysis
df = nb.current().dataframe(only successful=True)
```

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## Structure of this talk

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## Explorations

We've been experimenting with different network structures

- Especially interested in "clustered" networks: friends-of-friends and larger cycles
- ► Fine structure affects how processes evolve

Make the science more accessible <sup>6</sup>

- ► With available and re-usable code
- With explanations

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
<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>S. Dobson. *Epidemic modelling – Some notes, maths, and code*. Independent Publishing Network, 2020. ISBN 978-183853-565-0. URL https://simoninireland.github.io/introduction-to-epidemics/


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#### The epidemic threshold

Erdős-Rényi (ER) networks

- For *N* nodes build the complete network  $K_N$
- ► For each edge, retain ("occupy") it with probability *p*<sub>infect</sub>
- Leads to  $p_k$  normally distributed around  $\langle k \rangle = p_{infect} N$





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
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### Not all networks behave like this

Too "even" to be a good model of human contacts

• Powerlaw with cutoff,  $p_k \propto k^{-\alpha} e^{K/\kappa}$ 



• Relatively insensitive to  $p_{infect}$ , but sensitive to  $\alpha$  and  $\kappa$ 


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#### Adaptive networks

Things can become even more complicated when the network responds to the disease <sup>7</sup>

- ► For example quarantine
- Social contacts with infected people are reduced



#### ► Rewiring can balance (and even reverse) infection

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>S. Shai and S. Dobson. Coupled adaptive complex networks. *Physical Review E*, 87(4), April 2013. URL https://dx.doi.org//10.1103/PhysRevE.87.042812


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
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# Herd immunity

# Sufficient immune/recovered individuals to stop an epidemic propagating

- Infecteds never adjacent to enough susceptibles
- First epidemic changes the effective topology
- "Effective" (k) drops from 20 to 5.5





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#### Why pursuing herd immunity is a bad idea

Herd immunity was advocated by some as a covid-19  ${\rm strategy}^8$ 

Ignores some rather inconvenient facts

- ► A 1% death rate = 700K UK deaths, about one year's excess
- At a rate that would collapse health services
- Immunity looks not to be permanent which changes how herd immunity behaves (is it appears at all)
- Long COVID not accounted for in the costs

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>See the "Great Barrington Declaration", https://gbdeclaration.org

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
# VACCINATION

"Herd immunity without the bad bits"

- Aim for the herd immunity threshold, generally about 60% of the population
- ... without anyone actually being infected

Epidemic proceeds at different rates depending on topology

 "Enough" contacts removed to stabilise the size of outbreak



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
## VACCINATION STRATEGIES


#### Randomly vaccinate

- ► Massive reduction in epidemic size
- ...but need to get ¿60% of the population
- Only catching high-degree nodes at random

#### Target 2% highest-degree nodes

- Immunise the most likely super-spreaders
- Can also use social knowledge





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#### Physical distancing

What does a physically-distanced contact network look like?


 Good question: *lots* of assumptions, especially about compliance


Changes the epidemic threshold compared to an ER network

Needs a higher infectivity to take off

#### Slower take-off

- Not like a powerlaw network
- "Bursts" if the infection gets into a bubble





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## When multiple variants emerge

As the pathogen evolves, we see different variants with different behaviours

- Often more transmissible but less severe
- Coupled of increased immunity, leads to epidemic dying out

Environment controls selection pressures

- In systems with only short-range connections, highly contagious variants are often contained by previous infections
- Whereas in systems with long-range connections, the most contagious variant almost always spreads globally <sup>9</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> M. Boots and A. Sasaki. 'Small worlds' and the evolution of virulence: Infection occurs locally and at a distance. *Proceedings of the Royal Society B*, 266(1432):1933–1938, October 1999

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
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## CO-INFECTION DYNAMICS

What happens when variants co-exist?

- May co-operate: previous infection with one makes you more sensitive to the next
- Or may compete: having one reduces the risk of re-infection <sup>10</sup>

Lots more work to do to understand this



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> P. Mann, V. A. Smith, J. Mitchell, and S. Dobson. Two-pathogen model with competition on clustered networks. *Physical Review E*, 103(6), June 2021b. URL https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.103.062308

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## Structure of this talk

#### Conclusions

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## **Research** directions

Multiple variants

- What happens when disease evolve?
- More detailed co-infection dynamics

We're now very interested in network fine structure

- ► How do processes behave in detail?
- ► Can they be "steered" by disrupting small local features?
- New analytical techniques, based on graph signal processing
- Improved tooling, new software and algorithms

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## Three things to take away

BACKGROUND

- 1. Epidemic spreading still isn't fully understood there's lots of exciting work still to do, mathematically and computationally
- 2. Interactions between network and process can be very subtle, and may have significant effects
- 3. We can explore the space of public policy decisions as "citizen scientists", and also counter misinformation



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## References



M. Boots and A. Sasaki. 'Small worlds' and the evolution of virulence: Infection occurs locally and at a distance. *Proceedings of the Royal Society B*, 266(1432):1933–1938, October 1999.





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